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Inflation was a growing problem during the 1960’s and the 1970’s in Iceland. 
Inflation represents a problem for any entity that tries to write up a budget, whether 
an individual, a company or a governmental entity.  Many governmental entities do 
not have right to spend money unless what has been prescribed in the budget.  The 
purpose of this paper is to map out how inflation affected different parts of 
municipality budgets in Iceland during the 1960’s and the 1970’s.  Furthermore, to 
look at how well budget makers in the Icelandic municipality sector managed the 
task of forecasting inflation during the high inflation period of the 1970s. 
JEL: E31, E37, H68. 
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1 Introduction 
Budgetmaking in public institutions is never an easy task. Policy is changed as new 
political actors or new political majorities happen to enter the scene.  The entrance of 
new actors or new majorities will almost always result in projects or actions that have 
budgetary consequences; one politician may have promised to build a bridge, 
another a school or a kindergarten, a third may have promised to increase the salary 
of a given group of municipality employees and so on and so forth.  To complicate 
matters further for the budget maker: She has to base her estimates regarding costs of 
operating the institution on information gathered from bureaucrats that do not 
necessarily have incentives to share their knowledge in a completely truthful way.  
To take an example:  A bureaucrat in the office of education may choose to send only 
a low estimate for the cost of a new school if she believes that the probability of a go-
ahead for that building will be increased by doing so.  There are incentive 
mechanisms that can be tailored to induce bureaucrats to reveal correct information 
but at a cost (see Hindriks and Myles, 2006, chapter 4). Inflation complicates the task 
of information gathering and information processing in a way that is considerably 
different from the problems caused by the bureaucrat that supplies information 
selectively.  Note that we have that inflation usually does not affect labour costs in 
the same manner as it does the price of asphalt or the price of electricity for 
streetlights. Inflation will also affect the income side of a public budget disparately 
compared to the cost side.  Distinct parts of the costs will be affected in disparate 
ways, complicating the task of the budget maker still further.  The implication is that 
no matter how good the inflation forecasts are that the budget maker makes there 
will be some discrepancies, sometimes of considerable magnitude.  Prices of some 
categories of costs may develop differently from other categories.  Hence, in times of 
high inflation the budget maker will have little difficulty in finding excuses for 
overspending.  That opens an avenue for problems of agency at the level of 
politicians versus voters.  Politicians can promise a high level of investment activity, 
low taxes and budgetary surplus.  An outcome with high investment activity and a 
deficit rather than surplus could be blamed on the uncontrollable and unpredictable 
effects of inflation.  A “smart” budget-making politician may find it opportune to 
forecast inflation in such a way that the budget gives room for unrealistically high 
investment level using inflation ex-post as a scapegoat vis-à-vis the electorate. 
The purpose of this paper is to map out how inflation affected different parts of 
municipality budgets in Iceland during the 1960’s and the 1970’s.  Furthermore, to 
look at how well budget makers in the Icelandic municipality sector managed the 
task of forecasting inflation during the high inflation period of the 1970s.  The 
organization of the paper is such that an overview of the economic situation in 
Iceland in the 1960’s and the 1970’s is given in section 2.  Section 3 discusses our 
calculation of budgeted inflation according to the budget documents of the 
municipality of Reykjavik.  Section 4 reports attempts to convey if the municipality 
budgetmakers make their inflation forecasts based on the idea of rational expectation 
or adaptive expectations.  Section 5 concludes. 
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2 The Economic Situation in Iceland during the 1960’s and the 1970’s 
The 1960’s and the 1970’s were a period of rapid and fundamental changes in the 
Icelandic economy.  The regulation of economic activity introduced during the crisis 
of the 1930’s and the war of the 1940’s was still in effect towards the end of the 1950’s 
and the beginning of the 1960’s.  In the early 60’s external trade was liberalized to 
some extent and a system of multiple exchange rates was simplified (but not 
abolished fully).  The economy responded positively and growth rates of up to 5% 
per capita per annum were registered.  The process of rapid growth was abruptly 
brought to a halt in 1968 with the disappearance of Atlanto-Scandic herring from the 
fishing grounds around Iceland.  Atlanto-Scandic Herring had been the single 
biggest fish stock in the North-Atlantic and had been fished during its summertime 
breeding migration in the waters around Iceland by fishers from Iceland, Norway, 
and the Soviet Union, to name the most active.  The intensity of the fishing increased 
dramatically during the 1960’s as equipment improved and number of boats 
participating in the fishery expanded.   
The Icelandic economy recovered quickly, helped by exceptional increases in cod 
catches that filled the vacuum left by the vanished herring. Economic growth was 
also inflated by demand pressure created by the reconstruction boom following the 
Heimaey eruption and investment in equipment to harness geothermal energy as 
replacement for oil in home heating in the wake of the first oil crises in 1972-3.   
The boom of the early 1970’s soon proved to be a bit too much of a good thing for the 
small Icelandic economy.  Prices that formerly had increased faster than elsewhere, 
started to accelerate.  Inflation was not only fuelled by demand pressures but also by 
institutions like wage indexation on the supply side.  The praxis of wage indexation 
had been introduced as early as 1941 (see Jóhannes Nordal, 1996, p. 176). With 
increasing inflation the wage indexation rules became more and more rigid.  Wage 
indexation and demand-pull proved a dangerous composition where demand driven 
price increases fed into wage costs inducing “cost-push” price increases.  Rigid wage 
indexation ensured a second round of wage increases and cost induced price 
increases.  Thus, one of the jokes among Icelanders at the time was that frost during 
early fall in Brazil would increase wages, the reason being that the Brazilian frosty 
nights would reduce the supply of coffee on the world market, which in turn would 
induce higher prices of coffee.   The coffee price would eventually feed into the price 
index used to index wages in Iceland!  As a consequence of these feedback links, 
inflation in Iceland took an accelerating path during the 1970’s and the 1980’s.  This 
can be seen in Figure 1, which shows the percentage increase in the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) as well as the percentage increase in the price index for public 
expenditure (PEI).  The theme of this paper is to discuss how well bureaucrats 
managed to forecast the development of the latter index.  The construction of the two 
indexes is different; the CPI is a traditional Laspeyres price index while the PEI is a 
Paasche index.  Furthermore, the CPI reflects development of prices of consumer 
goods; both imported and domestically produced, while the PEI reflects the 
development of costs of producing governmental services.  Hence, the wage 
development of governmental employees weighs heavily in that index.  Indexation 
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of wages was based on the CPI index, with a lag of 1-3 months.  Compensation for 
increases in the consumer price index was 100% for long periods. 
Figure 1. Development of the general price inflation and inflation in 
cost of governmental expenditure 1960 to 1982. 
 
Source: Icelandic historical statistics, Statistics Iceland. 
Figure 1 shows that inflation in Iceland was highly volatile during the period even 
when yearly averages are compared.  Public Expenditure inflation seems to lead the 
CPI inflation some of the years.  That seems logical given the feedback mechanism 
described above:  The PEI index reflects wages.  A general increase in wages will 
affect prices with a lag of a few months, starting the process of staggered increases in 
wages and prices due to indexation.  It is not to be expected that the CPI exactly 
replicate the movement of the PEI as price increase impulses could originate from 
other sources than that of general wage agreements.  Frost in Brazil causing higher 
coffee prices would be an example of a price impulse that would affect the CPI ahead 
of the PEI. 
3 Budgeted Inflation according to the Municipality of Reykjavik 
3.1 Making of a Budget 
Making a budget for a governmental entity is never an easy task.  Politicians are 
subjected to pressures from special interest groups as well as from the public at large 
when deciding the size of the budget and its distribution between tasks and projects.  
Budget officials are subjected to pressure from fellow bureaucrats eager to have the 
funding they believe they need in order to do their assigned job properly.  A 
multitude of interests is involved, partly parallel and partly conflicting.   Adding 
inflation to this mix of interests does increase the degree of complication 
considerably. 
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Also adding to the degree of complication was the fact that exposure to inflation was 
different for different levels of government.  Increase in inflation would increase state 
income and state expenditure, cet. par. as the state income was to a high degree 
based on indirect taxes (sales tax, import duties).  Hence, both expenditure and 
income would be moved in the same direction when inflation took unexpected turns.  
The situation at the municipality level was a bit different before the Pay-As-You-Earn 
system was introduced in 1988.  Municipality income was based on last year’s 
income by individuals and firms and by the valuation of fixed assets (homes/real 
estate) owned by individuals by December 1st the year prior to payment of the tax.  
Municipalities thus had their income fixed in nominal terms at the start of the budget 
year.  Changes in inflation would thus hardly have any effect on the nominal income 
accruing to the municipalities while having the potential of affecting the expenditure 
part seriously. 
Inflation was taken into account in various ways in the state budget during the 
period under consideration.  Towards the end of the period we are investigating it 
became almost a rule that the Minister of Finance fixed and disclosed a 
“multiplication factor” for the state budget.  This was the factor used to extrapolate 
from the average price level of the year prior to the budget year into the average 
price level of the budget year.  Hence, if the multiplication factor was 30%, while the 
average CPI for the year 19X0 was 100, then the budget would be presented on the 
assumption that the average CPI for year 19X1 would be 130.  Ministers of Finance 
were eager to explain that the multiplication factor was not a projection for the 
inflation one year ahead as they were not willing to risk political capital on such a 
risky gamble. The multiplication factor was usually considerably lower than inflation 
at the time and also considerably lower than inflation expectations of economic 
agents at the time.  The announcement of multiplication factor that was obviously so 
far out of line with expectations can be interpreted as a vain attempt to nudge 
inflationary expectations downwards. 
The Municipalities were advised by the National Economic Institute on matters 
relating to general economic prospects, including inflation, when preparing their 
budgets Snævarr, (2008).  As an autonomous governmental institution the National 
Economic Institute prepared the National Budget based on present knowledge and 
governmental policy.  The National Budget is a political document explicitly based 
on governmental policy and prospects for parameters exogenous to the Icelandic 
economy.  It could prove a hard task to project the development of the economy 
when the government proposed unrealistic changes of policy. 
The balance of the budget, size of the investment budget and increase in service 
charges were all matters of debate when municipalities represented their budgets.  
However, basic parameters such as expected inflation were not discussed at any 
length. 
3.2 Calculating Unexpected Inflation 
Presumably the municipalities projected the development of nominal costs based on 
known and expected wage increases and expected inflation as reported by the 
National Economic Institute.  Expected wage increases would presumably weight in 
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heavily as municipality services are labour intensive.  We decided to back-calculate 
assumptions by using development of given posts in the budget and the accounts of 
the City of Reykjavik.  We excluded investment and repair from our investigation 
and used the following formula to calculate unexpected inflation: 
  (1) 
Here, is increase in price level for municipality inputs (inflation) in year  in 
excess of what was expected at time t.   and  are accrued costs and budgeted 
costs as recorded in the accounts and the budget, respectively, for year .  
stands for price-level in year .  The formula is based on the assumption that 
realized real-increase in accrued costs, , of the chosen budget posts was 
planned.  Assume that the real costs do not change from year  to year  so that 
. Assume further that budgeted costs were assumed to increase by .  
Then .  Assume also that the accrued costs increase by  from 
year to year so that .  Plugging these assumptions into equation 
(1) yields an estimate for unexpected inflation as .  Unexpected inflation 
would be estimated to be zero if .  Data for the years 1959 to 1972 were collected 
and used to estimate unexpected inflation for the years 1960 to 1972.  Figure 2 shows 
the development of budgeted versus realized (accrued) expenditure for the chosen 
budget items according to the budget and the annual profit and loss statements for 
City of Reykjavik. 
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Figure 2. Budgeted versus realized expenditure of selected non-
investment items in constant prices. 
 
Source: Ársreikningar Reykjavíkur, Statistics Iceland. 
The reduction in budgeted and real expenditure in 1972 is due to transfer of funding 
for law enforcement (policing) from the City of Reykjavik, as well as from other 
municipalities, to the central government (see Matthiasson, 1983). 
3.3 Calculating Expected Inflation 
Once unexpected inflation has been estimated the calculation of expected inflation is 
straightforward: 
  (2) 
Here  stands for realized inflation while  stands for expected inflation.  
Figure 3 shows the development of expected inflation as well as the development of 
realized inflation. 
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Figure 3. Expected (budgeted) inflation and realized inflation 
estimated from City of Reykjavik budget papers. 
 
Source: Statistics Iceland and Árbækur Reykjavíkur. 
Figure 3 shows that the realized inflation is always higher than the expected inflation 
as we have estimated it.  The figure indicates that expected (budgeted) inflation is 
systematically lower than realized inflation.  The figure also indicates that the budget 
makers adjusted their expectations to reflect increased or decreased inflationary 
pressure in the economy. 
4 Brands of Expectation Errors 
Inflation-forecasting errors can have a multitude of origins.  In governmental 
instructions errors can be caused by formal or informal rules and principles.  An 
example is the rule long adopted by the Icelandic Ministry of Finance not to include 
assumed effects of unfinished wage negotiations in the inflation forecast used in the 
yearly governmental budget proposal.  Such rules make the task of the budget maker 
easier but the forecast is subject to a systematic downward bias.  Yet it is hard to see 
how to include an assumption about the size of next year’s wage increase in the 
budget proposal, as the budget maker will usually be on the employer’s side in wage 
negotiations.  In that case the employees would take any announcement of assumed 
results from unfinished wage negotiations as a starting point for their demands!  
Thus no matter how realistically the budget maker forecasts the price and wage level 
his or her adversaries at the negotiation table will render such efforts inaccurate!  
Similar arguments can be made for other types of costs where prices are matter of 
negotiation.  A governmental decision maker is at a disadvantage if making perfectly 
honest forecasts in budget documents prior to finishing important deals. 
Inflation-forecasting errors can also be made due to “mechanism” failure.  I.e. the 
budget maker may be using bad models or bad or wrong assumptions to make 
his/her forecasts. 
 Tímarit um viðskipti og efnahagsmál, Special Issue 2008 79 
 
Inflation-forecasting errors can also be intentional.  Keep the setting for the 
municipalities in the 1960’s and the 1970’s in mind.  Income was fixed in nominal 
terms a year ahead.  A high estimate for inflation would inflate costs and leave a 
smaller amount available for investment than would a low estimate of inflation.  
Many politicians in local politics will agree that running the municipality is the dull 
part of the job.  Working on investment projects and seeing a new project take shape 
is the fun part.  Hence, the bias is to have as much money for investment as possible, 
taking all the usual side-conditions into consideration (re-electability etc.). 
4.1 Rational Expectations 
In reality errors will be caused by all the effects mentioned above.  Models are never 
perfect, people nudge forecasts into a direction that is “good” for them and all 
bureaucrats have to follow some set of rules that are inflexible in some significant 
way.  Thus, inflation forecasting is not an exact science.  Economists have tried out 
two partially competing theories regarding the essence of the error.  One line of 
theory suggests that economic agents do not err systematically, i.e. that their 
expectations are “rational”.  According to this line of argument we can write realized 
inflation as function of predicted inflation in the following way: 
  (3) 
Here,  is the error made by the forecaster.  According to the theory we have that: 
 
Keane and Runkle, (1990) propose a test to see if expectations regarding the rate of 
inflation a period ahead have been formed according to the theory of rational 
expectation by estimating the parameters of the following equation: 
  (4) 
Here  is a vector of variables that might be of relevance and known to the 
forecaster at the time of forecasting.  If the theory of rational expectations does hold 
we have that ,  and . Variables that might be suggested as 
elements in the  vector include various data on perceived macroeconomic balance 
(excess demand, external balance, prospects for the fisheries).  Such information was 
known at a much lower level of precision during the 1960’s and 1970’s than now.  
Furthermore, little quantified information from the period is obtainable now.  We are 
thus left with estimating parameters in a simplified version of equation (4).  Running 
the appropriate regression yields: 
  (5) 
         
Figures in parentheses are standard deviation of the estimates.  We can reject a joint 
hypothesis that  and  at  level of significance ( ).  The 
evidence suggests that budget makers consistently predict inflation at a level  
below the realized level.2 
                                                 
2  The formulation of the model does not fare well in a Ramsey RESET test, indicating 
omitted variables.  The formulation fares better in Breusch-Godfrey LM test for 
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4.2 Adaptive Expectations 
The rational expectation hypothesis does not seem to fare well when confronted by 
how the budget makers in the Icelandic municipalities did make their forecasts.  An 
alternative method to model expectations is to assume that the budget maker 
observes past error and adjusts new forecasts by accepting part of the error as a 
“mistake” that should be accounted for in the next forecast: 
  (6) 
Here it is assumed that .  If  then the budget maker does keep his 
forecast fixed, irrespective of the error experienced in the past.  If  the opposite 
is true and the budget maker uses last period’s experience as his forecast for the 
present period. 
A forecaster that sticks to a rule like the one revealed in equation (6) will make 
predictable errors.  Agents making predictable errors are likely to lose money, as 
other agents will be able to use the knowledge of the errors to come to their own 
advantage. A bank that systematically under-predicted inflation would 
underestimate the cost of deposits and charge too low interest on non-indexed loans.  
Such a bank would soon go out of business in an environment of non-indexed assets.  
So economic agents can hardly survive in a competitive environment if making 
forecasts in the fashion of adaptive expectations for variables of importance. 
There is no doubt that next year’s inflation was a variable of significance for 
municipalities in the 1960’s and the 1970’s.  But the municipalities did not operate in 
a competitive environment.  And they were not making leveraged bets based on their 
forecasts regarding the level of inflation as many other players in the economy might 
have done.3  Individuals could only take out loans from the municipalities by being 
slow in paying their taxes. Hence, while making forecasting errors was potentially 
bad, it was not to the same degree as in the private sector. 
Note also that decisions in a municipality are not made by a monolithic dictator.  
Bureaucrats prepare information that should help politicians to decide.  The 
politicians have to consider whether they are told the whole truth by the bureaucrats.  
Furthermore, the politicians may favour biased forecasts for political reasons as 
already hinted at.  Note that the lower the inflation forecast the less of the nominal 
income already fixed will be needed for the day-to-day operation of the municipality 
and more can be channelled to investment.  A politician in favour of investment in 
municipality infrastructure (roads, schools, other public buildings, libraries, 
kindergartens etc.) will also be in favour of not overstating the rate of expected 
                                                                                                                                            
autocorrelation, where the null hypothesis of no-serial correlation is not rejected 
(Prob=0.4575). 
3  A financial institution does make long term commitments on the asset site but must 
usually rely on short term deposits for financing these commitments.  Such an institution 
conspicuously underestimating the going rate of interest on deposits some periods into the 
future will have a long line of customers willing to take loans.  If the lenders wait a bit 
they can redeposit the money in the bank at a profit!  Needless to say, there is no limit to 
the demand that would be created in this way. 
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inflation!  Politicians with distaste for investment projects might favour a high 
estimate for expected inflation.  Assume that investment-loving municipality 
politicians outnumber investment-averse politicians. Will it not ruin their reputation 
as politicians to constantly underestimate the rate of inflation?  Well, they can always 
blame the bureaucrats! 
The case for survival of economic agents forming expectations about inflation 
according to the rule of adaptive expectations is much stronger in the case of the 
public sector than in the case of the private sector. So let’s put the data to test and 
start out by using the adaptive expectation rule: 
  (7) 
   
The Prais-Winsten routine of STATA is used to estimate the coefficients  
( ℎ =−0.31, adjusted .  The three stars indicate significance at the 1% level.  
The figures below the estimated parameters are standard deviations.  The regression 
was also run with a constant, which was not significantly different from zero at the 
5% level. 
Assume that equation (7) is a correct description of the process used by budget 
makers to produce inflation forecasts.  Then the budget makers will underestimate 
inflation when prices are accelerating and overestimate inflation when prices are 
decelerating.  But our discussion so far suggests that politicians might react 
differently when the economy is overheated as compared to when the economic 
temperature is more normal.  This is not easily tested given the data available.  One 
attempt is reported as equation (8): 
  (8) 
   
The Prais-Winsten routine of STATA is used to estimate the coefficients  
, adjusted . The indication is that budget makers in the 
municipalities behave differently when predicting inflation in times of accelerating 
inflation as compared to when inflation is falling.  When the economy is overheated, 
in the sense that inflation is accelerating, then budget makers in the municipalities 
had tendency to adjust their inflation estimate.  When inflation was going down they 
were more prone to stick to last year’s inflation estimate.   Note that this behaviour is 
likely to add to pressure in the economy at inflationary times (by increasing the 
probability of deficit due to underestimation of inflation) and to reduce pressure in 
times of contraction (by increasing probability of a surplus as inflation may be 
overestimated). 
5 Concluding Remarks 
Economists have long assumed that economic agents form expectations in a rational 
manner, as not doing so would be harmful to their financial health.  Some have 
wondered how frequently economic agents should bother to revise their expectations 
Haltiwanger, (1985) and Akerlof, (1985).  The consensus from this literature seems to 
be that if some (even small) proportion of the public does revise their price-
expectations infrequently it will have macro-economic consequences. 
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Agents in the public sector, whether in central government or in the municipality 
sector may not have the opportunity to revise their spending plans as frequently as 
private actors.  In addition they may have politically motivated incentives to 
underestimate inflation rather than overestimate it.   
Our results indicate that municipality budget makers are not likely to adjust their 
projection for next period’s inflation in big steps.  Our results also indicate that their 
behaviour is different when there is pressure in the economy as opposed to when 
there is less pressure. 
The asymmetry is likely to induce policy makers to underestimate inflation at time of 
pressure and overestimate inflation at time of less pressure.  The consequence of 
underestimation of inflation is likely to be that “too much” funds are channelled to 
municipality investment.  At the end of the day the municipalities are likely to 
overspend.  The tendency to underestimate inflation would thus have contributed to 
further increasing the instability of the Icelandic economy in the time under 
consideration.  
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